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Lawyers as Agents
G.H.L. FRIDMAN*
This article addresses the nature and effect o f  the agency relationship 
that exists between a lawyer and his client. There are two aspects o f  
this, the internal relationship and its external effects. Under the first 
heading are considered the duties o f  the lawyer towards his client, in­
cluding his fiduciary duties, which have recently been broadened, 
and the obligation o f  the client to pay his lawyer. The external aspect 
o f  a lawyer's role as agent fo r  his client raises the issue o f  the agent's 
authority which may be express, implied or apparent. The scope o f  
that authority is vital. It is analysed in respect o f  two different situa­
tions. The first is where no litigation is involved, but the lawyer is re­
quired to deal with money on behalf o f  the client, contracts within 
the Statute of Frauds, or notices. The second relates to the conduct 
o f  litigation. A  number o f  important issues arise in this respect, o f  
which the most important is the authority o f  a lawyer to compromise 
or settle an action. This is considered in some depth with special 
reference to English and Canadian cases, in order to elucidate the ex­
tent to which and grounds upon which a lawyer may validly affect 
his client’sposition. G.H.L.F.
L 'article suivant étudie la nature et les conséquences des relations 
d'agence qui existent entre un avocat et son client. On envisage 
deux aspects principaux: les relations internes et les conséquences 
externes. Le premier thème traite des obligations de l'avocat envers 
son client y  compris les obligations fiduciaires, qui ont été elargies 
récemment, et de la responsabilité du client de régler les honoraires 
de son avocat. L'aspect externe du rôle de l'avocat, comme agent 
de son client, soulève la question de l'autorité de l'agent qui peut 
être expresse, implicite ou apparente. L'étendue de cette autorité 
est d'importance capitale. On l'analyse en tenant compte de deux 
situations différentes: La première n 'implique aucun litige, plutôt 
l'avocat doit s'occuper des affires de son client, des contrats dans le
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cadre du Statute of Frauds, ou des préavis. La deuxième situation 
sa rapport à la conduite du litige. De nombreuses questions se 
présentent, la plus importante étant l'autorité de l ’avocat de régler 
une cause par compromis, ou de la résoudre. On a réfléchit longue­
ment à ces questions en tenant compte des arrêts Anglais et Cana­
diens, afin de pouvoir élucider dans quelle mesure et sous quel 
m otif un avocat peut affecter la position de son client.
Lawyers, like taxi-cabs, are for hire. Unless they are full-time employees acting 
as in-house counsel, they are independent contractors, not servants: they con­
tract to provide services, not service. Furthermore, unlike certain other in­
dependent contractors, lawyers may also be agents. Even a lawyer acting 
gratuitously, where services are provided free of charge in a legal clinic or 
similar operation, can be an agent. Payment of an agent is not a necessary 
prerequisite for the creation and existence of the relationship of principal and 
agent.1 In such circumstances there is an agency relationship without a con­
tract between lawyer and client. It is still the theory in England that there is no 
contractual relationship between the lay client and the barrister who represents 
him.2 But a contractual relationship arises between a client and a solicitor 
whom he employs for advice or for representation in litigation. The distinction 
between solicitor and counsel has disappeared in many common law jurisdic­
tions including Canada; it persists in England, although certain previously ac­
cepted consequences of that distinction have ceased to follow since the deci­
sions of the House of Lords in Rondel v. Worsley and Saif A l i \ .  Sidney Mit­
chell & Co.3 A  negligent barrister can sometimes be held liable in negligence to 
his lay client in much the same way as a negligent solicitor.4 But the distinction 
does not seem to have been of great importance in relation to the effect of acts 
by a solicitor or counsel performed on behalf of the client. The lack of any 
contractual relationship between counsel and client was not a barrier to the 
possibility that what counsel did on behalf of the lay client might bind and af­
fect the legal position of the latter. Where this was the issue, the test was not 
whether a contract existed between the two but whether the act in question was 
within the scope of the authority of solicitors and counsel in general, or the 
particular solicitor or counsel involved. Only when the issue was the possible 
liability of a solicitor or counsel to the client did the question of contract 
become relevant.
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That was the situation under the older law. A sharp line was drawn bet­
ween liability in contract for certain kinds of negligent acts and liability in tort 
for negligence. The absence of a contract between the parties necessitated an 
investigation of the legal policy involved in a decision whether or not to impose 
a duty of care independently of contract. The same developments may have 
occurred with respect to the liability of solicitors and counsel to non-clients. 
No contractual duties can arise between a solicitor or barrister and someone 
for whom he or she does not act. Under the older law this would have preclud­
ed any possible liability to such a person on the part of a solicitor or barrister 
in the absence of fraud or some other deliberate, wrongful act that might be 
tortious. In view of the evolving law of negligence, it may now be possible for 
liability to be imposed on a solicitor or barrister for conduct which causes 
harm to someone other than his client. This is the case in England and Canada 
where a solicitor’s negligence resulted in the loss of an inheritance by a poten­
tial beneficiary.5 Such liability does not stem from the law of agency. It 
depends upon the principles of the law of torts. An agent may become liable to 
a third party as a consequence of what the agent does for and on behalf of the 
principal. Liability of this kind is not imposed on the agent by virtue of his 
agency or under the doctrines of the law of agency; it is created by the applica­
tion of settled principles of tort to the particular instance of an agent of the 
kind or class involved.6 Whether such liability can or should be imposed is a 
question that must be answered by reference to the underlying policies and 
aims of the law of torts, not by a consideration of the purposes of agency and 
the legal consequences that flow from the employment of an agent.
There is one important qualification to this. The law of agency does 
govern the situation where the agent lacks authority to act as an agent in 
respect of the matter that is in issue and, while acting without authority, has 
innocently misled a third party. Under the doctrine of “ implied warranty of 
authority” the agent may be liable qua agent to the third party, without proof 
of negligence or fraud.7 This form of liability has been recognized and ac­
cepted by the courts for more than a hundred years, although its true juridical 
nature has yet to be clarified. All that is certain is that liability emerges from 
the fact that a party purports to act as an agent when he is not or, though an 
agent, lacks authority to do what he has done. That this may affect lawyers is 
made clear in an English decision of long standing.8 If this form of liability 
seems beyond challenge both in general and in relation to the particular situa­
tion of lawyers, in order to elucidate its precise legal character, it is necessary 
to consider the effects of the employment of a lawyer on the relationships bet-
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ween the client and his lawyer, the client and those with whom his lawyer has 
dealt, and the lawyer and those with whom the lawyer has dealt purportedly on 
behalf of the client.
Before undertaking consideration of the agency relationship between a 
lawyer and his client, it should be pointed out that a lawyer may occupy 
another role vis-à-vis his client. He may be a trustee in certain situations, either 
expressly or by implication. Indeed, in a recent case which will be discussed it 
was the fiduciary aspect of a lawyer’s relationship with his client that brought 
about the lawyer’s liability to the client. In this essay, however, I am concerned 
with the role of lawyer as agent.
II
Agency law defines the consequences of an agency relationship between prin­
cipal and agent as well as between principal and the third party or parties with 
whom the agent deals in the course of the performance of his duties as agent. 
To some extent principal and agent can determine those consequences. Where 
the principal confers a specific, express authority upon the agent, the powers 
of the agent with respect to the outside world are circumscribed by the instruc­
tions which he has received and the law pays particular attention to such in­
structions. Subject to the usual limitation of legality, principal and agent can 
exercise complete freedom of action with regard to the conferment of part or 
all of the principal’s legal powers upon another. Thus a client can retain a 
lawyer for a particular occasion or purpose or can grant a general retainer. He 
can give precise instructions as to how the lawyer is to proceed. But this cannot 
affect a barrister’s performance of his duties as counsel, since the way in which 
counsel behaves in court is controlled by his own discretion with respect to the 
conduct of a case and by the duty which counsel owes to the court. The latter is 
a “ public” duty which has precedence over the contractual or other duties ow­
ed by counsel to his client.9 Neither the discretion of counsel, nor the proper 
performance of the duty which he owes the court as its officer will always ex­
cuse counsel from liability to his client for the improper performance of his 
task as counsel. Counsel may not be liable for failing to call a witness or for 
refraining from asking a witness a particular question. Such failure or refusal 
may stem from counsel’s perception of his duty towards the court, for exam­
ple, if asking the question might involve some improper allegation that is out­
side the boundaries of professional conduct. Counsel will be liable, however, if 
he fails to attend a trial on behalf of his client thereby depriving his client of 
the representation for which the client has engaged him. Failure to appear at a 
trial without a reasonablé explanation or excuse is professional negligence for 
which a lawyer in Canada (though perhaps not a barrister in England) can be 
held liable to the client.10 The differentiation between instructing a lawyer as to 
the task he or she is to perform and purporting to control the method whereby 
that task is to be accomplished is clearly based upon the dual character of a 
lawyer. He represents his client in legal proceedings and in the conduct of cer­
tain non-litigious matters. At the same time he is expected to maintain certain
’This is the basis of the discussion in Rondel v. Worsley, supra note 3.
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standards of behaviour and to uphold respect for the law and the dignity of the 
legal process. In this respect a lawyer acting as a solicitor or as counsel serves 
another master. His function is to ensure that legal activities are carried on in 
accordance with the interests of the public at large, and not only in the in­
terests of his particular client. A lawyer may be an agent, but one who fulfills a 
public as well as a private function.
This peculiar characteristic of lawyers is exemplified by another aspect of 
the agency relationship — compensation. In other agency situations it is 
legitimate for principal and agent to agree on any method of remuneration. An 
agent may be compensated for his work by an agreed, fixed sum or by a 
calculable percentage of the profit obtained by the principal from the activities 
of the agent. It may be agreed that the agent may or may not be rewarded 
depending upon the success or failure of his enterprise." Generally, lawyers 
are not to be rewarded in this manner. Contingent fees are forbidden in some 
jurisdictions in Canada, as well as in England.12 The common law frowns 
upon such arrangements, because they suffer from the taint of champerty, the 
sharing of the proceeds of private actions. Champerty and maintenance were 
crimes and torts at common law. They were prohibited primarily on the 
ground that to permit such arrangements might encourage unjustified litiga­
tion; and possibly because they might seduce parties and lawyers to fabricate 
evidence in order to succeed thereby interfering with counsel’s proper perfor­
mance of his duty to the court.13 The will to win is not per se objectionable. 
The will to win at all costs in order to earn a fee is much less acceptable. Hence 
in Wild v. Simpson, a majority of the English Court of Appeal would not 
recognize an agreement between a client and his solicitor under which the 
solicitor was to receive a percentage of the amount recovered by the client on a 
counterclaim if, and only if, the client recovered more than was sufficient to 
pay the client’s creditors in full and all his legal expenses.14 If the client lost on 
the counterclaim, the solicitor was not to look to the client for his costs except 
disbursements. The solicitor was originally retained to defend an action 
brought against the client by the third party. The counterclaim was later deter­
mined upon by the client. When the client lost on the counterclaim, the 
solicitor sued to recover his costs basing his claim on the original agreement, 
not the one relating to the counterclaim. It was held that the original agree­
ment had been varied by the subsequent one made when the counterclaim was 
undertaken. This second agreement was champertous and therefore illegal. 
Hence no claim could be brought for breach of its terms. But it was 
recognizable to the extent that it rendered the earlier lawful agreement as to
11Bowstead, supra note 1 at 210-12; Law o f Agency, supra note 1 at 164-66.
12 Wallerstein v. Moir (No. 2) (1974), [1975] Q.B. 373 (C.A.); Trendtex v. Credit Suisse (1981), [1981] 3 W.L.R. 
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payment of the solicitor inapplicable. No claim could be based on that agree­
ment according to Atkin L .J., because it had not been completely 
performed.15 The solicitor had prevented himself from such completion by his 
own act in making an illegal agreement. Therefore, he could not sue on a 
quantum meruit nor on the original agreement. It might have been thought 
that since the champertous second agreement was void for illegality, it should 
not have affected the first; a perfectly valid and lawful agreement to pay the 
solicitor his fees. The common law dislikes champertous contracts to such an 
extent that the court was prepared to give enough effect in law to the invalid 
second agreement to deprive the solicitor of any redress or compensation.
This particular restriction may be unique to lawyers, but they also share 
an important characteristic of all agents. They are expected to observe higher 
standards towards their principals than non-agents who may be employed in 
various activities. Lawyers as agents are treated as fiduciaries, as are express or 
constructive trustees, public officials and many others.16 This involves lawyers 
in special obligations with respect to their clients’ money or financial affairs. It 
is a well known fact that lawyers are under special duties with regard to trust 
accounts which they maintain for their clients. However, in a recent decision 
an Ontario court has indicated that the fiduciary nature of a lawyer’s relation­
ship with his client may have more far-reaching effects. The case is Szarfer v. 
Chodos.11 A solicitor acted for the plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action. 
While so doing he learned that the plaintiff was having marital difficulties. 
The plaintiff’s wife worked in the defendant’s office on a temporary basis as a 
legal secretary. Adultery took place on several occasions between the defen­
dant and the plaintiff’s wife. It caused the plaintiff distress when he discovered 
this. The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of fiduciary duty in conduc­
ting an adulterous affair with the plaintiff’s wife, and claimed general, special 
and punitive damages. The old common law action for criminal conversation 
was abolished in Ontario in 1978 under a provision “ designed to supplement 
the abolition of the concept of marital unity by eliminating any cause of action 
which treated the wife as the husband’s chattel” .18 It was also designed to 
abolish actions based on adultery. The issue in this case, however, was not 
whether injury had been caused to the plaintiff by the adultery. It was whether 
there was a claim for injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant’s use of 
confidential information for his own purposes: the action was founded on the 
allegation that the plaintiff’s mental and emotional status was adversely af­
fected by the defendant’s misuse of confidential marital information. 
Callaghan A.C.J.H.C. held that a viable cause of action existed, based on (a) 
the fiduciary character of the relationship between solicitor and client, and (b) 
the solicitor’s use of this confidential information gleaned in the course of that
liIbid. at 1095.
l6Bowstead, supra note 1 at 156-204; Law o f Agency, supra note 1 at 152-63.
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relationship for personal advantage.19 Apart from the consequence that the 
statute law dealing with criminal conversation and actions for damages for 
adultery was neatly finessed by a subtle use of legal principles formerly 
employed for a specific purpose, it must also be said that the obligations of a 
fiduciary have been extended in a manner not previously contemplated by 
generations of equity lawyers who gradually evolved a very strict approach to 
the relationship that exists between a fiduciary and a beneficiary. A fiduciary 
must not only keep his hands off his beneficiary’s money; he must also keep 
his hands away from his beneficiary’s spouse.
Given the learned judge’s zeal to compensate a plaintiff who was un­
doubtedly injuriously affected by counsel’s unethical behaviour, he was 
perhaps inclined to take the language of cases dealing with misuse of confiden­
tial information and Professor Waters’ discussion of the equitable principles 
governing the obligations of fiduciaries somewhat too literally.20 Insofar as the 
situation involves the duties of lawyers, it seems to add new dangers to the 
practice of law. As it applies to fiduciaries and therefore agents generally it in- 
voves a retrograde approach to the law now contained in such statutes as the 
Family Law Act of Ontario.21 Elsewhere I have discussed what I term the 
abuse of agency.22 In this decision, I suggest, a new abuse of one aspect of 
agency can be seen in operation. It is one thing to require good faith of an 
agent and a proper concern for the welfare and interests of his principal. It is 
quite another to say that this obligation extends to the personal relationship 
between a principal and his or her spouse.
Ill
Consideration of the fiduciary duties of an agent indicates that the law is not 
only concerned with what a principal has expressly authorized or instructed his 
agent to do, but also with the obligations that arise ex lege once the relation­
ship of principal and agent has been created. In fact many aspects of that rela­
tionship involve what is implicit rather than what is explicit. More often than 
not much is left unsaid between principal and agent and it is necessary for the 
law to fill in the gaps and provide the details of both the powers and the 
liabilities of agents. This is certainly true with respect to lawyers. A client may 
do no more than engage a lawyer to undertake certain legal business, such as 
the negotiation of a contract or to act on his or her behalf in legal proceedings. 
Bare authorizations make it imperative to discover what is entailed in the 
employment of a lawyer in this regard. This is vital not only from the point of 
view of determining whether the lawyer has carried out his instructions cor­
rectly, but also for the purpose of knowing whether what the lawyer has done
19 Ibid.
20E.g., Seager v. Copydex Ltd. (1967), [1967] 2 All E.R. 415 (C.A.); Peter Pan Mfg. Corp. v. Corsets Silhouettes 
Ltd. (1962), [1964] 1 W.L.R. 96. (Ch.); R. Goff & G. Jones, Law o f Restitution, 2nd ed., (London; Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1978) at 512-13: cf; Phipps v. Boardman (1966), [1967] 2 A.C. 46 (H.L.); D.W.M. Waters, Law o f 
Trusts in Canada, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at 710, 731.
21S.O. 1986, c.4.
22G.H.L. Fridman, “The Abuse and Inconsistent Use of Agency” (1982) 20 U.W.O.L.R. 23.
can affect the legal relations between the lawyer’s client and the other party to 
a contract or litigation.
Much of the difficulty involved in determining the scope of a lawyer’s 
authority in these various activities stems from the ambivalence of the lawyer’s 
situation. Counsel represent their clients and are simultaneously officers of the 
court; private and public duties co-exist. Solicitors, referred to in earlier times 
and in some modern jurisdictions as attorneys, as if to emphasize their role as 
agents, are both men of the law and men of affairs (to employ in an English 
translation a well-known French phrase describing lawyers). They participate 
in the conduct of legal proceedings whether at the pre-trial stage or, as in 
Canada and many other common law jurisdictions, in court.They also act on 
behalf of clients where litigation is not contemplated or invoved. Consequently 
it is no simple matter to apply to lawyers the notion of “ usual” authority, a 
component of an agent’s implied authority and his ostensible or apparent 
authority.23 Both implied and apparent authority can extend and enlarge an 
agent’s actual, express authority. Both, to a certain degree, involve considera­
tion of what an agent of the class or type in question would usually do when 
engaged upon the kind of function that is involved. How is one to determine 
what is “ usual” for this purpose? Therein lies the difficulty. It is basically a 
question of fact calling for evidence of what is understood or accepted in the 
particular trade, profession, business or undertaking that is in issue. However, 
as with certain types of implied terms, judicial decisions may have produced a 
network of “ usual” acts in relation to certain forms of activity such as 
stockbroking, the sale of real estate, factoring and, what is more relevant to 
the present discussion, fulfilling the functions of a lawyer.24 Where such 
“ usual” acts are involved, it would be more correct to say that one is dealing 
with implied rather than ostensible or apparent authority. The former is vir­
tually a conclusion of law which is rebuttable only on proof of the negation of 
such authority by some express prohibition or limitation (the effect of which 
falls to be considered later). Conversely, apparent or ostensible authority is a 
conclusion of fact that is dependant on the particular circumstances and is not 
a matter of law which binds a court.
The courts have not always clearly differentiated between these two 
distinctive types of authority. Reference is made to “ implied” authority when 
what is involved is really ostensible or apparent authority and vice versa. The 
notion of implied authority stems from what the courts have decided is 
necessary or usual, or sometimes customary to include within the scope of an 
agent’s express authority.23 On the other hand, ostensible or apparent authori­
ty is based upon representations, by words or conduct, made by the principal 
which induce in a third party the reasonable belief that the agent has authority 
to perform the act that is in question.26 Although an attempt was made to state 
the difference plainly and positively by Diplock L. J. in Freeman & Lockyer v.
2iBowstead, supra note 1 at 95, 290-91; Law o f Agency, supra note 1 at 59, 106-07.
2*Shell (U.K.) Ltd. v. Lostock Garages Ltd. (1976), [1977] 1 All E.R. 481 at 487-88 (C.A.), Lord Denning. 
2>Law o f Agency, supra note 1 at 58-68.
2iBowstead, supra note 1 at 284-92.
Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd., cited frequently in Canadian 
courts, there lingers in the language of some judges a sense of confusion as bet­
ween implied and ostensible authority, which is compounded, if not caused, by 
the frequent use of the expression “ usual” authority to denote circumstances 
in which authority may be implied or may be “ apparent” .27 Yet it is vital to 
distinguish the two. Each has a different purpose and effect.
Implied authority is designed to extend an undoubted agent’s express 
authority by taking into account whatever an agent of the kind involved would 
naturally and normally do, or have power to do, for the proper performance 
of his duties. Acts done within the scope of an agent’s implied authority bind 
the principal and render the agent free from liability for alleged breach of du­
ty. Ostensible or apparent authority may exist in someone who is not an agent 
at all, or may have the effect of enlarging the authority of someone who is an 
agent. It serves to protect a third party who has dealt in good faith with the 
agent, in the belief that the agent was acting with propriety. Acts done in the 
exercise of ostensible or apparent authority bind the principal, however an 
agent or non-agent who acts in such a way may be liable to the principal (or the 
one who is treated as a principal vis-à-vis the third party) on various grounds 
— fraud, negligence, or breach of duty. It follows there may be a marked and 
vital distinction between the implied authority of a lawyer with respect to cer­
tain matters and his ostensible or apparent authority. An examination of the 
cases indicates that as a matter of law, certain acts are within the scope of a 
lawyer’s authority by implication, whereas other acts may come within the 
scope of his authority only if the lawyer in question, in contrast with lawyers as 
a class, has been held out by the client as having the power to act in such a way. 
In many areas this distinction is very clear. In relation to compromises or set­
tlements however, no such clarity exists.
IV
The nature and scope of a lawyer’s authority may be examined from the two 
points of view previously mentioned — activities unrelated to litigation, and 
activities that occur in the course of legal proceedings. Since most of the cases 
are English, they involve acts by counsel or by solicitors. For Canadian pur­
poses this distinction is not significant. With respect to non-litigious matters it 
would seem that a lawyer as such has no implied authority to receive payment 
of a debt owed his client; payment to the lawyer is not, therefore, payment to 
the client barring subsequent proceedings for the debt, even where the lawyer 
was employed to sue the defendant who subsequently paid the debt.2* Admit­
tedly this was the decision in a case in which the lawyer employed another to 
locate the defendant to obtain payment with the instructions that if the defen­
dant did not pay, the party delegated the task of receiving payment was to 
return the matter to the plaintiff’s attorney. But it would appear from other 
cases that if a country solicitor employs a local lawyer to perform on his and
27(1963-64), [1964] 1 All E.R. 630 at 644 (C.A.).
21 Yates v. Freckleton (1781), 2 Doug. 623 (K.B.); but see Powel v. Little (1747), 1 B1.8 (K.B.); cf. Bank o f Mon­
treal v. Casa (1975), 10 O.R. (2d) 274 (H.C.).
the client’s behalf, the act of such local lawyer will be the act of the original 
lawyer.29 Therefore, it may be argued that payment to the lawyer’s local agent 
was not payment to the client, implying that even if payment had been made 
directly to the client’s lawyer that would not have sufficed to discharge the 
debt. Only if the client received the money — which would presumably 
amount to ratification of the lawyer’s action as long as the client knew what 
the money was and where it came from — would the payment be valid and 
discharge the debtor.30 This applies not only to money owed to the client, or to 
money which was paid by way of compromise (of which more will be said 
later), but also to purchase-money belonging to the client, money due to him 
under a mortgage, or money received by the lawyer for the purposes of invest­
ment generally as opposed to money received for the purpose of being invested 
on a particular security.31 Hence in Bourdillion v. Roche, one partner in a firm 
of solicitors could not be held liable for the misappropriation by the other 
partner of money received by the latter, unless the party sought to be held 
liable was a party to the transaction.32 It was not within the authority of the 
partners to receive such money; therefore the act of the partner who did 
receive such money was not an act pertaining to the agency relationship bet­
ween the partners. A contrast was drawn by the court between the position and 
functions of a solicitor or attorney and those of a “ scrivener” .33 It would ap­
pear from what was said that scriveners, a class of persons who seem to have 
disappeared from modern life, were employed to receive and invest money on 
behalf of their clients. Such agents would have the kind of implied authority to 
deal with money that is lacking on the part of lawyers.
The receipt of money, therefore, is not part and parcel of the everyday, 
accepted duties of a lawyer. Lawyers are not debt-collectors, nor are they con­
duits through which money that should be paid to a client can be channelled in 
the ordinary course of business. As a corollary of this, lawyers are not agents 
with authority to bind their clients by an acknowledgement of a debt, so as to 
oust the operation of a statute of limitations. A person is not an agent for the 
purpose of making an acknowledgement unless he is duly authorized to make 
it.34 However, it is not necessary that the agent should have authority to 
acknowledge a mortgage as the solicitor did in the course of the cor­
respondence with the plaintiff’s solicitor in Wright v. Pepin.35 There the defen­
dant’s solicitor had written to the plaintiff’s solicitor about a mortgage of pro­
perty by the defendant. It was held that this amounted to an acknowledgement 
of the existence of the mortgage, the enforcement of which was in issue in
29Griffiths v. Williams (1787), 1 T.R. 710 (K.B.); Withers v. Parker (1859), 28 L.J. Ex. 292, aff’d (1860), 29 L.J. 
Ex. 320 (Ex. Ch.).
)0Bowstead, supra note 1 at 64-65; Law o f Agency, supra note 1 at 79-80; Macaulay v. Polley (1897), [1897] 2 
Q.B. 122 at 123 (C.A.) A.L. Smith L.J.; or if the principal held out the solicitor as a person allowed to settle the 
matter and by so doing became estopped from denying his authority.
31 Viney v. Chaplin (1858), 27 L.J. Ch. 434 (C.A.); Bourdillon v. Roche (1858), 27 L.J. Ch. 681 (V.C.).
i2Ibid.
33See Wilkinson v. Candlish (1850), 19 L.J. Ex. 166; Harman v. Johnson (1853), 2 E.&B. 61 (Q.B.).
iABowring-Hanbury’s Trustee v. Bowring-Hanbury (1942), [1943] Ch. 104 (C.A.).
35(1954), [1954] 2 All E.R. 52 (Ch.).
subsequent litigation. When an action was brought on the mortgage the defen­
dant wished to plead limitation as a bar. This plea failed. Although the defen­
dant’s solicitor did not have implied, and certainly not express, authority to 
acknowledge the existence and validity of the mortgage and the debt due 
thereunder, she was authorized to take steps to put the defendant’s affairs in 
order. In the course of doing this the fatal letter was written. It bound the 
defendant.
A similar problem has arisen in relation to the Statute of Frauds, which 
requires a note or memorandum in writing of certain contracts, signed by the 
party to be charged or some other person “ thereunto by him lawfully authoriz­
ed” .36 A solicitor could be expressly authorized to sign a document that fulfills 
the requirements of the Statute, such that the principal could be sued on the 
contract.37 What if no such express authorization has been established? In 
Smith v. Webster, it was held that a letter from the defendant’s solicitor to the 
plaintiff which set out sufficient details of the contract to satisfy the Statute 
was not a note or memorandum under the Statute.3* The solicitor had not 
authority to write a letter containing the terms of the contract, only to prepare 
a formal document to be sent to the other party for approval. Ultimately an 
agreement was to be signed by the parties themselves, not their agents. Other 
decisions suggest that there may be occasions when a solicitor can sign a note 
or memorandum and thereby bind his principal under the Statute of Frauds. 
This may be the case where the solicitor is empowered to sign a document as a 
record of the contract that is eventually in issue or is authorized to complete 
the contract.39 Similarly, when counsel signed a defence to a statement of 
claim which referred to the transfer of property by the defendant to X under a 
contract of purchase and sale, this bound the defendant and entitled the defen­
dant to claim that the property in question belonged to X.40 Thus a lawyer’s 
signature will fulfill the requirements of the Statute of Frauds when the lawyer 
is expressly authorized to do what would naturally and reasonably include the 
signing of a document recognizing the existence of a contract within the 
Statute. Differences in outcome result from differences in the nature of the 
work the lawyer is expressly authorized to do for his client. Correspondence 
does not necessarily involve admissions about contracts whereas pleadings do 
if the admission is relevant to the proceedings in which the pleadings are re­
quired. Similarly, making records of contracts and completing them must en­
tail signing documents that acknowledge the existence and the terms of such 
contracts.
A further question surrounds the ability of a lawyer to receive notices on 
behalf of his client. Generally a lawyer does not have this authority. This is
36Ibid. at 56 Harman J.
37Cf. H. Clark (Doncaster) Ltd. v. Wilkinson (1965), [1965] Ch. 694 (C.A.).
3*(1876), 3 Ch. D. 49 (C.A.).
19John Griffiths Cycle Corp. v. Humber & Co. Ltd. (1899), [1899] 2 Q.B. 414 (C.A.); Daniels v. Trefusis (1913),
[1914] 1 Ch. 788; North v. Loomes (1919), [1919] 1 Ch. 378.
established forcefully in Singer v. Trustee o f  the Property o f  Munro.41 The 
trustee of a bankrupt firm of solicitors applied for release from the 
trusteeship. Before this could be done, the trustee was obliged to give notice of 
his intention to all the creditors. In his affidavit the trustee swore that he had 
sent notices to the creditors at their respective addresses but the notice to the 
applicant had been sent to the applicant’s solicitors in England, though the ap­
plicant lived in France. The order of release was granted. The applicant ap­
plied for an order to reverse the decision to grant the release on the grounds 
that he had never received proper notice under the bankruptcy rules. Walton J. 
held that the trustee should have informed the court that he had sent the notice 
to an address other than the address of the creditor in question. Had he done 
so, and provided he had a reasonable explanation, he might well have been ex­
cused. The release was held to have been obtained improperly in that it had 
been granted on evidence that was in part untrue. The crucial point, it is sug­
gested, is that contrary to the trustee’s belief, albeit honestly held, notice to the 
applicant’s solicitor did not constitute notice to the applicant without express 
authority to the solicitor to receive such a notice. In the absence of such ex­
press authority, it was not part of the duties or functions of a solicitor to 
receive notices on behalf of his client. This decision suggests that a solicitor 
possesses only limited powers to act for a client in business, as contrasted with 
legal matters. The discharge or release of a trustee in bankruptcy may involve 
the legal process; but whether such discharge or release should be granted in­
volves a decision by the creditor on the financial merits of the case. The 
creditor must himself know of the prospect of such release. The language of 
Walton J. was sufficiently broad to comprehend other business situations in 
which notice may be relevant, such as notices to quit or to terminate a lease 
and notice of facts which would preclude a finding that a party was a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice in certain circumstances involving property 
title. In all such instances therefore, a lawyer must be expressly authorized to 
receive the appropriate notice before a party seeking to rely on such notice can 
safely assert that the principal is deemed to have received the notice himself.
V
When one turns to the position of lawyers in relation to the conduct of legal 
proceedings, there is a body of case law which is at once strong and am­
biguous. The courts appear to have taken quite contradictory attitudes to the 
same issue. For the purposes of the ensuing discussion, a division will be made 
between various acts of a lawyer which do not involve the compromise or set­
tlement of litigation on the one hand and the difficult area of the effect of a 
compromise or settlement on the other.
Although agents are not usually allowed to delegate their tasks to another 
agent, it has been held that a country solicitor authorized to institute a suit on 
behalf of his client was justified in employing an agent for that purpose in 
London where the Court of Chancery sat.42 Clearly it was an implied part of
4 ‘(1981), [1981] 3 All E.R. 215 (Ch.); cf. the situation with respect to real estate agents in Woeller v. Orfus (1979), 
27 O.R. (2d) 298 (H.C.).
42Solley v. Wood (1852), 16 Beav. 370 (Ch.).
the country solicitor’s authority that he could delegate the commencement of 
proceedings, as this was a necessary — and in the early 19th century perhaps a 
usual — way of fulfilling his duty as an agent. However, if the town agent of a 
country solicitor were given authority for a particular purpose, he was not per­
mitted to institute other proceedings on behalf of the client.43 Moreover, a re­
tainer given by a country solicitor did not justify the issuance of a writ by a 
London firm of solicitors on behalf of the client and the country solicitor. The 
London solicitors had not been authorized to issue a writ in the name of the 
client.44 Chitty J. pointed out an important aspect of agency in general and the 
employment of lawyers in particular: “ A man employs a solicitor because he 
has confidence in him, and it is that confidence which renders it necessary for a 
litigant to have the assistance of one solicitor rather than another” .45 This 
seems to contradict the approach in the case referred to earlier involving the is­
suance of a bill in Chancery. Perhaps the reason for the differing result lies in 
the kind of authority given by clients to country solicitors. Instructions to 
commence an action necessarily imply the power to do whatever is necessary 
for that purpose; however, authority for such a specific purpose does not 
necessarily imply power to do something not within the originally authorized 
purpose. Nor does a general retainer, without specific instructions to sue, 
authorize a country solicitor to use another agent to begin an action. In the 
Canadian context, such situations might arise if a lawyer in one province made 
use of an extra-provincial lawyer or if a rural lawyer thought it necessary to 
employ an urban lawyer. It would then become important to determine 
whether the authority given to the first lawyer could extend to the employment 
of the second lawyer, and if so, the scope of such authority.
An important if controversial qualification must be noted. Regardless of 
whether the authority of a lawyer to commence an action is characterized as 
express or implied, the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Yonge v. 
Toynbee indicates that it ceases to operate if and when the client becomes in­
sane or otherwise loses legal capacity.46 Even if the lawyer is ignorant of the 
change in the client’s status, there is no automatic continuance of the lawyer’s 
authority. Once a lawyer is expressly authorized to undertake litigation, there 
is no apparent or ostensible authority that extends the duration of his express 
authority any more than there is any ostensible or apparent authority that can 
extend the scope of his express authority. In Yonge v. Toynbee, solicitors ac­
ting for a defendant in an action entered an appearance and delivered a 
defence on behalf of the defendant without knowledge of the supervening in­
sanity of their client. The defendant’s solicitors were personally liable for the 
plaintiff’s costs incurred in responding to the defence as they were acting 
without authority. They breached the “ implied warranty of authority” which 
underlies any action of an agent purporting to act on behalf of a principal
4i Malins v. Greenway (1847), 17 L.J. Ch. 26.
44 Wray v. Kemp (1884), 26 Ch. D. 169.
4$Ibid. at 172.
46 (1909), [1910] 1 K.B. 215 (C.A.).; Bowstead, supra note 1 at 513-16; Law o f Agency, supra note 1 at 357: 
unless the authority has been given by deed: ibid. 509-10, 350 respectively: cf. Powers o f Attorney Act, R.S.O. 
1980, c. 386.
when he is not an agent or when he lacks the authority to act as he has.47 The 
nature of this liability is still an open question.4* The term “ warranty of 
authority” suggests a contractual basis for the liability. But it is hard, if not 
impossible, to find any contract between the “ agent” and the third party who 
is injuriously affected by the “ agent’s” behaviour. In the absence of fraud or 
negligence, neither of which was present in this case, it is difficult to conceive 
of any tort that was committed by the solicitors. Nor does this seem to be a 
situation in which the law of restitution or unjust enrichment is relevant.
The effect of the decision in Yonge v. Toynbee is to place lawyers at con­
siderable risk. Although acting in good faith and without negligence, they ap­
pear to be absolutely liable if their authority is withdrawn by operation of law. 
It has been held that where an agent loses authority to act but — without fault 
on his part — is ignorant of that loss, such agent may continue to have 
authority on the basis of estoppel, so as to bind the principal to the third party 
with whom the agent has transacted after the cessation of the agent’s original 
authority.49 If this is correct, as is suggested, it should follow that the agent 
would not be personally liable to the third party for any alleged breach of the 
implied warranty of authority. There seems no reason why such an approach 
should not be taken with respect to solicitors in the position of those in Yonge 
v. Toynbee. To hold the solicitors personally liable in such a case is 
unreasonable and inconsistent with the policy of the law with respect to tran­
sactions involving insane parties where the insanity is unknown to those deal­
ing with the insane party. It should not make any difference that the insane 
party is dealing through an agent, as long as there is ignorance of the insanity 
on the part of both agent and third party.
Once a lawyer has been entrusted with the conduct of litigation, it would 
seem that he has a very large measure of control over what will happen. Thus, 
where a solicitor was acting under a general retainer in relation to proceedings, 
it was held in a Canadian case that he had the power to discontinue the 
action.50 As early as 1696 it was held that waiver of a client’s rights by a lawyer 
might bind the client.51 In the latter case, the plaintiff’s attorney waived the 
fact that the defendant had pleaded joinder of issue outside the proper time 
after he had signed judgement on behalf of his client. Later the client wished to 
deny the joinder of issue. It was held that the client was bound by the 
attorney’s conduct and could not now insist on the enforcement of the original 
judgement. In a similar vein, where a solicitor’s town agent took money paid 
into court by the defendant, the solicitor’s client could not later sue on the
47Cf. the authorities cited supra note 7.
**Bowstead, supra note 1 at 458-60; Law o f Agency, supra note 1 at 213-14.
49Smout v. Ilbery (1842), 10 M.&W. (Ex.); Drew v. Nunn (1879), 4 Q.B.D. 661 at 668, Brett L.J.; Re Parks 
(1956), 8 D.L.R. (2d) 155 (N.B.S.C.A.D.): cf. Wilkinson v. Young (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 275 (Ont. H.C.): 
Bows lead, supra note 1 at 522-25. See also, for England, the Enduring Powers o f Attorney Act, 1985, c.29.
soKennedy v. Gunnar-Nesbitt Aviation Ltd. (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 288 (Alta. S.C.T.D.).
iXLatuch v. Pasherante (1696), 1 Salk. 86 (K.B.); cf. Smith v. Troup (1849), 18 L.J.C.P. 209.
debt.52 As Pollock C.B. subsequently stated, the act of the solicitor’s agent 
was the act of the solicitor.53
A number of cases in the 19th century involved issues relating to admis­
sions or other statements made by attorneys or solicitors and counsel in the 
course of proceedings between the principal and another party. Sometimes 
such statements were uttered in court, sometimes outside the courtroom. 
Sometimes they were made directly to the other party; at other times to some 
third person, the other party’s agent or a stranger. On such distinctions of fact 
have been founded distinctions as to the authority of the attorney or counsel 
and, in consequence, the binding or non-binding effect of such statements. 
Thus an offer made by the plaintiff’s attorney in the hearing of X to do 
something in relation to the defendant, although the offer was within the at­
torney’s authority, was inadmissible in evidence so as to affix the plaintiff with 
such offer.54 It would have been otherwise, so it was said, if the offer had been 
made directly to the defendant himself. Nor was an admission by an attorney 
in a conversation, made with a view to obviating the necessity of proving facts 
admitted at the trial, evidence against the attorney’s principal.55 Nor was a 
statement made by counsel out of court binding on the client. So when counsel 
said that he would forebear for a certain time to move to make a rule nisi ab­
solute pending the hearing of the rule nisi, but the rule was later made absolute 
before the time mentioned by counsel, it was held that the rule could not be re­
opened and re-argued.56
It would appear that only admissions of disputed facts by a solicitor are 
binding on the client. Hence in Petch v. Lyon , a statement by the plaintiff’s at­
torney to the defendant’s attorney that a debt was owing from the late hus­
band of the defendant and not the defendant herself, could not be given in 
evidence against the plaintiff.57 It was not something that affected the issues at 
stake in the trial; it was merely loose conversation. Nor will an admission 
about one set of proceedings bind the client with respect to other 
proceedings.5' However, if the statement is relevant to the matter in question, 
such as the ownership of a vessel against the owners of which the plaintiff was 
bringing an action, then such a statement will bind the client.59 So too will an 
admission by counsel in court or before a judge in chambers, even if unsup­
ported by an affidavit. It will be regarded as true and therefore admissible in 
evidence.60 However, a modern English case throws this proposition into some
52Griffiths v. Williams (1787), 1 T.R. 710 (K.B.).
,3 Withers v. Parker (1859), 28 L.J. Ex. 292, aff’d (1860), 29 L.J. Ex. 320 (Ex. Ch.).
,4 Wilson v. Turner (1808), 1 Taunt. 398 (C.P.).
55 Young v. Wright (1807), 1 Camp. 139 (K.B.).
>6Richardson v. Peto (1840), 1 Man. & Gr. 896 (C.P.).
57(1846), 9 Q.B. 147.
s%Blackstone v. Wilson (1857), 26 L.J. Ex. 229.
59Marshall v. Cliff {1815), 4 Camp. 133 (K.B.).
t0Haller v. Woman (1861), 3 L.T. (N.S.) 741 (K.B.).
doubt.61 In H. Clark (Doncaster) Ltd. v. Wilkinson the vendor of property 
was not bound by an admission made by counsel with respect to the authority 
of the vendor’s original solicitor to sign a contract of sale on the vendor’s 
behalf.62 In this instance the plaintiff had not acted to his detriment on the fact 
of the admission. It was a triable issue whether the solicitor who signed the 
contract had express authority to do so. If he lacked such express authority, 
then as noted earlier, he would not have had authority to sign the contract of 
sale and purchase — and the vendor would not have been bound. The Court of 
Appeal stated that an admission made by counsel in the course of proceedings 
can be withdrawn unless such an admission gives rise to an estoppel.63 It 
should be noted that Lord Denning M.R. distinguished an admission of this 
kind from a compromise entered into by counsel, which might bind the client 
on the basis of counsel’s ostensible authority.64 Plainly Lord Denning was 
distinguishing between the implied authority of counsel, or a solicitor, to make 
admissions relevant to the proceedings in which he is engaged and the ostensi­
ble or apparent authority of counsel, or a solicitor, to enter into an agreement 
under which the client settles an action. What lawyers can do to commence or 
carry on proceedings may fall within the implied authority of a lawyer in the 
sense that has been explained. What a lawyer can do with respect to the settle­
ment of proceedings may involve the notion of ostensible or apparent authori­
ty, which, as noted, turns upon very different considerations of law and fact.
VI
The most important and complex aspect of a lawyer’s authority as an agent in­
volves the settlement or compromise of an action. In 1890 Kekewich J. refer­
red to the valuable power of compromise that was placed in the hands of 
counsel, valuable that is to say from the point of view of the client.65 The 
power and right to settle can be utilized effectively by parties to an action to 
achieve a satisfactory and perhaps less costly resolution of a dispute. Insofar 
as the settlement of an action by a lawyer with or without his client’s consent 
can bind the client, it is obvious that considerable power resides in a lawyer’s 
hands. The courts are also extremely interested in the settlement or com­
promise of an action, at least where the action has been commenced and is in 
the process of coming before a court. Hence the cases indicate that where a set­
tlement or compromise is entered into in the face of the court or after pro­
ceedings have been started, the consent of the court may be required. The re­
quirement of such participation may lead to the possibility that a settlement or 
compromise may be upset by a party, even though that party’s lawyer had 
agreed to the settlement.66
61See also Dawson v. Great Central Rly. Co. (1919), 88 L.J.K.B. 1177 (C.A.).
“ (1965), [1965] Ch. 694 (C.A.).
6}The Clifton: Kelly v. Bushby (1835), 3 Knapp. 375 (P.C.).
64(1965), [1965] Ch. 694 at 703.
65Lewis’s v. Lewis (1890), 45 Ch. D. 281 at 283.
66Shepherd v. Robinson (1919), [1919] 1 K.B. 474 at 477 (C.A), Bankes L.J.; Neale v. Gordon Lennox (1902), 
[1902] A.C. 465 at 470-72 (H.L.), Lord Halsbury, Lord Macnaghten; Pineo v. Pineo (1981), 45 N.S.R. (2d) 576 
(S.C.T.D.).
Various factors have been considered relevant to the legal effect of these 
settlements. Unless a client has expressly authorized his lawyer to compromise 
an action or has ratified such a compromise after it has been concluded, it 
becomes necessary to determine whether a lawyer can effectively bind his client 
by a settlement on the basis of some other form of authority, whether implied 
or ostensible. Although the precise nature and limits of that authority remain 
unsettled, certain clues may be found in the cases as to the situations in which a 
compromise by a lawyer may bind his client. It must also be borne in mind that 
even though a compromise may be effective between the client and the other 
party to the compromise, the very fact that a compromise has been entered in­
to by a lawyer on his client’s behalf may involve that lawyer in liability to his 
client. This might happen if he acted without actual express authority, or 
without authority implied from his employment as a lawyer.67 Moreover, even 
if a lawyer is expressly authorized to enter into a compromise or settlement, he 
may still be in breach of duty to his client if the settlement was made negligent­
ly or fraudulently.68 It must not be thought that because a lawyer is endowed 
by his client or the law with authority to compromise or settle an action, he 
may not be in breach of his agency obligations when he does so. The failure to 
distinguish these two aspects of the legal consequences of a compromise may 
have led courts into difficulties over the years.
Around the year 1860, three cases raised the issue of an attorney’s power 
to compromise an action.69 Fray v. Voules held that an attorney who com­
promised an action when he had been instructed not to settle would be liable to 
his client for nominal damages, even though the compromise had been made 
on the advice of counsel retained by the attorney under the latter’s own re­
tainer for the conduct of the cause.70 Liability arose despite the bona fides of 
the attorney, and the fact that settlement was reasonable and for the benefit of 
the client. Lord Campbell C.J. raised, without answering, the question 
whether such a compromise would be binding as between the agent and third 
parties even though it was ultra vires between the attorney and his client.71 In 
Chown v. Parrott an attorney who entered into a compromise without the con­
sent of his client though not against an express prohibition, was not guilty of 
negligence as long as he acted bona fide, with reasonable care and skill and for 
the benefit of his client in making such compromise.72 Again the issue was as 
between attorney or agent, and client or principal. It was not until Prestwich v. 
Poley in 1865 that the binding nature of a compromise became the issue.73 A
67Butler v. Knight (1867), L.R. 2 Ex. 109; Fray v. Voules (1859), 1 E.&E. 839 (Q.B.); Thompson v. Howley 
(1976), [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 16 at 25 (S.C.).
68 Welsh v. Roe (1918), 87 L.J.K.B. 520; Chown v. Parrott (1863), 14 C.B.N.S. 74 (C.P.).
69For an earlier decision see Swinfen v. Swinfen (1857), 24 Beav. 549 (Ch.), (1858), 2 De G.&J. 381 (C.A. Ch.); 
on which see Brightman L.J. in Waugh v. H.B. Clifford & Sons Ltd. (1981), [1982] 1 All E.R. 1095 (C.A.).
70(1859), 1 E.&E. 839 (Q.B.).
71 Ibid. at 847. Presumably he had forgotten about Latuch v. Pasherante (1696), 1 Salk. 86 (K.B.) (See text at 
note 51 supra), which was recalled by Farwell J. in Re Newen (1903), [1903] 1 Ch. 812 at 818.
72(1863), 14 C.B.N.S. 74 (C.P.).
73(1865), 18 C.B.N.S. 806 (C.P.); see also Strauss v. Francis (1866), L.R. 1 Q.B. 379; Butler v. Knight (1867), 
L.R. 2 Ex. 109.
was employed as an attorney to sue B for the price of a piano sold and 
delivered to B. A agreed to take back the piano if B should pay the cost by in­
stallment. A’s principal, the client who had sold the piano to B, repudiated this 
agreement and sued B. The question for the court was whether the action 
should be stayed on the ground that it had been settled without express 
authorization by the client. Nonetheless the court held that the compromise 
bound the client as it was made within the general scope of the attorney’s 
authority as an agent. The decision might have been different if the attorney 
had agreed to accept other goods in satisfaction of B’s liability. This last point 
hints at the idea of something “ collateral” to the action which the lawyer is 
engaged to deal with, that later became of some importance. In the words of 
Montague Smith J.: “ The attorney is the general agent of the client in all mat­
ters which may reasonably be expected to arise for decision in the cause.” 74
The attitude of the court in this case was that a lawyer retained to deal 
with litigation on behalf of a client had a “ general authority” to act on the 
client’s behalf, which included authority to compromise the action as long as 
he acted bona fide, reasonably, and not in defiance of direct and particular in­
structions. The tenor of the language used by the court suggests that it was im­
plied authority that was meant by the term “ general authority” . Although the 
issue arose between client and the third party defendant in the action, and not 
between principal and agent, the court was concerned with the nature of the 
authority given to the attorney. Hence the importance of the absence of any 
express prohibition against compromise. Since the attorney was not expressly 
forbidden to settle, he was implicitly empowered to do so. As Farwell L.J. 
observed in the later case of Re Newen, where the English Court of Appeal en­
dorsed the principle of Prestwich v. Poley and earlier decisions: “ It is within 
the scope of a solicitor’s authority to compromise, and if he uses all due 
diligence and acts bona fide and reasonably, no action will lie against him, but 
if he has been expressly forbidden to compromise and he does compromise, 
then however beneficial that compromise may be, an action will lie against him 
for disregarding that express negative direction” .75 In that case, a compromise 
was entered into by solicitors in Liverpool, engaged by the defendants’ Lon­
don solicitors. The compromise bound the defendants even though there was 
no privity between them and the local agents. In holding this the court follow­
ed earlier decisions referred to above, where acts by a country solicitor engag­
ed by a solicitor in London bound the London client (and vice versa).76 In this 
case it was also held that a letter from the defendants’ London solicitors to the 
Liverpool solicitors did not amount to an express prohibition of any settle­
ment. A similar attitude to the agent’s authority to compromise was taken in 
Little v. Spreadbury, where the clinet had agreed to a compromise, but later 
argued that the actual compromise entered into by the solicitors of both parties
7<(1865), 18 C.B.N.S. 806 at 816 (C.P.): it was also held that the managing clerk of the attorney having the 
general conduct of the attorney’s business enjoyed the authority of the attorney.
” (1903), [1903] 1 Ch. 812 at 817; viz., Latuch v. Pasherante, supra note 71; Chowrt v. Parrott, supra note 72.
16Supra notes 42-44: cf. Withers v. Parker (1859), 28 L.J. Ex. 292, aff’d (1860), 29 L.J. Ex. 320 (Ex. Ch.).
did not accord with the terms which she agreed to accept.77 Her claim was 
denied and she was found liable for breach of the agreement reached in the 
compromise. The court made it clear that the solicitors had authority to bind 
their client; they had the power to compromise with respect to the subject mat­
ter of the action, though not with respect to collateral matters.
The authority to compromise arose once a writ had been issued. Once this 
had occurred the solicitor of a party to the action had implied general authori­
ty, according to McCardie J. in the subsequent case of Welsh v. Roe , to com­
promise or settle the action.78 No limitation on this power imposed by the 
client could affect the solicitor’s power unless brought to the notice of the 
other side. McCardie J. drew a distinction between the effect of such a com­
promise on the parties to the action and its effect as between client (principal) 
and solicitor (agent). While the client might be bound by the compromise, the 
solicitor could be liable to the client if the compromise were effected negligent­
ly or in violation of his instructions.79 The power to compromise could not be 
exercised, however, before an action was brought unless specific instructions 
to that effect had been given. There was no implied authority entrusted to a 
solicitor to settle prior to his being given control of an action.80 However, in 
Butler v. Knight in 1867, it was held that in some situations a solicitor could ef­
fect a binding compromise without express instructions to do so after judge­
ment had been rendered.81 While as a general proposition the force of an at­
torney’s retainer and his power to bind the client by a compromise ceased 
when judgement was rendered, the attorney did have implied authority to 
recover the amount of the verdict.82 Therefore it would appear that he could 
settle with the judgement debtor and bind his client even if in so doing he 
violated his duty, as Pigott B. stated.83 This decision seems open to question in 
view of the later remarks of both Horridge J. and Atkin J. in Re a Debtor (No. 
1 o f  1914) in which it was held that a solicitor’s retainer to conduct an action 
did not include the authority to compromise the action after judgement by 
assenting to the execution by the defendant of a deed of arrangement of his 
property to a trustee for the benefit of his creditors.84
From the 1860s to 1919, English courts developed the idea that a solicitor 
or attorney had implied authority to bind his client by a compromise once the 
lawyer or attorney had been entrusted with the task of pursuing an action. 
That authority would suffice to create an effective compromise with another
77(1910), [1910] 2 K.B. 658 (C.A.). See also the earlier case of Matthews v. Munster (1887), 20 Q.B.D. 141, app’g 
the differentiation of “collateral” matters that was formulated by Pollock C.B. in Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford 
(1860), 5 H.&N. 890 at 922 (Ex.): discussed by Brightman L.J. in Waugh v. H.B. Clifford & Sons Ltd. (1981), 
[1982] 1 All E.R. 1095 at 1103, 1104 (C.A.).
7,(1918), 87 L.J.K.B. 520.
19Ibid. at 521.
80Macaulay v. Polley (1897), [1897] 2 Q.B. 122 (C.A.).
•'(1867), L.R. 2 Ex. 109.
*2Ibid. at 113, Kelly C.B.
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party, although it might not protect the lawyer from liability to his client if the 
latter had expressly countermanded the power of the lawyer to compromise, or 
the lawyer had acted otherwise than bona fide, or unreasonably, or against the 
interests and not for the benefit of his client.85 Nor would any such com­
promise bind the client if the client had assented to it under a misapprehension 
or mistake as to its meaning and effect.86 Moreover, there were cases which 
stated that the client’s consent to a compromise or settlement could be 
withdrawn if this was done before an order was issued by the court, unless the 
withdrawal of such consent was the result of a change of mind rather than an 
awareness of a previous misapprehension.87 In such instances the agreement 
was reached by counsel, not a solicitor or attorney. The authority of counsel to 
agree to a settlement was also clear as long as counsel acted within the scope of 
his instructions.88 Thus, in contrast with the general implied authority of a 
solicitor or attorney to compromise, even possibly where a prohibition against 
settlement had been made by the client, the authority of counsel to com­
promise extended only as far as his specific instructions. However whether the 
compromise was arrived at by counsel or a solicitor, it would not be binding on 
the client if it had been reached contrary to instructions and such prohibition 
had been brought to the attention of the other party.
The orderly development of this area of the law was disrupted, however, 
by the decision of the House of Lords in 1902 in Neale v. Gordon Lennox 
which may be said to have made the question of a lawyer’s authority to com­
promise or settle unclear.89 The plaintiff in a slander action authorized her 
counsel to agree to the reference of the action to a form of arbitration on con­
dition that the defendant made a disclaimer of all implications on the 
plaintiff’s character. This limitation on the authority of counsel was not com­
municated to the other party. The plaintiff’s counsel agreed to the reference 
but failed to obtain the requested disclaimer. An order for the reference was 
made by the court. The plaintiff’s counsel did not act under any misapprehen­
sion or mistake as to the extent of his authority. The question was whether the 
order for a reference should be set aside and the case be allowed to go for trial. 
The Court of Appeal held that the order should stand, because the purported 
limitation on counsel’s ostensible authority (as it was described in the Court of 
Appeal) would not operate without notice to the other side. In coming to this 
conclusion the Court of Appeal followed earlier authorities discussed above, 
save for the characterization of counsel’s authority to settle as “ ostensible” , 
rather than as implied. It may be suggested that the court confused ostensible 
with implied authority in this instance. Prior decisions seemed to consider that 
the authority of a lawyer to act in this way was implied into the appointment to 
act in the matter.
,5I.e., by acting collusively with the other side: see McCardie J. in Welsh v. Roe, supra note 68 at 520.
16Lewis’s v. Lewis (1890), 45 Ch. D. 281; Shepherd v. Robinson (1919), [1919] 1 K.B. 474 (C.A.).
17Holt v. Jesse (1876), 3 Ch. D. 177 (V.C.); Harvey v. Croydon Union Rural Sanitary Authority (1884), 26 Ch. 
D. 249 (C.A.).
**Swinfen v. Swinfen (1858), 2 De G.&J. 381 (C.A. Ch.); Furnival v. Bogle (1827) 4 Russ. 142 (Ch.).
The House of Lords reversed this decision. In the view of their lordships, 
counsel had no authority to refer an action against the wishes of his client or 
on terms different from those which his client was prepared to accept. A 
reference may be set aside although the limit on counsel’s authority was not 
made known to the other side. The court was not bound to sanction an agree­
ment made by counsel which was not, in the opinion of the court, a proper 
one. This seems to run counter to the 19th century cases. Lord Halsbury, 
however, emphasized the importance of counsel’s position as an officer of the 
court and held that the court would not be deprived of its general authority 
over justice by an unauthorized act of counsel.90 He also pointed out that there 
might be various reasons why the court should not approve a compromise or 
settlement between counsel, even though the other party had acted on the ap­
parent authority of counsel to enter into the agreement.91 Lord Lindley sug­
gested that the ordinary principles of agency, on which previous decisions were 
based, were only part of what was to be considered.92 The attitude of the 
House of Lords, therefore, appears to have been that at least where an agree­
ment to refer a case was involved in contrast with the more usual situation of a 
compromise or settlement of an action, the issue was not one simply for the 
law of agency; it concerned the administration of justice and the role of the 
court in litigation. Perhaps the case may be distinguished on the basis that it 
involved a reference, not a compromise. Perhaps it may be distinguished on 
the ground that the court had acceded to the reference sought by the parties 
under the mistaken belief, induced by counsel, that the parties had agreed to 
such a reference, so that to uphold the court’s order might have meant 
perpetuating a deception upon the court. Perhaps in the special circumstances 
of the case agency alone did not govern the situation.93 Unless some distinction 
along these lines can be made, the case seems to invalidate much of what had 
been previously decided. Furthermore, the reference by the House of Lords to 
the “ apparent” or “ ostensible” authority of counsel to settle a case seems to 
contradict prior references to the “ implied” authority of solicitors, attorneys 
or counsel in matters of this sort. Unless the House of Lords meant “ implied” 
when they spoke of “ apparent” authority, the judgement in this case in­
troduces a new element of confusion into an already perplexing area.
An early commentary on this case is found in Little v. Spreadbury.94 Bray 
J. distinguished the Neale case by pointing out a difference between cases 
where the court was involved and those where the contract between the parties 
could be carried out without the intervention of the court.95 Lord Coleridge J. 
was of the opinion that the client could always repudiate a compromise or set­
tlement on the ground of mistake as long as this was done at the earliest possi­
ble moment, after knowledge of the mistake and before any order was drawn
90(1902), [1902] A.C. 465 at 470 (H.L.): cf. Lord Macnaghten at 472.
91 Ibid. at 470-71.
92Ibid. at 473.
93It was distinguished as a special case by Watkins J. in Marsden v. Marsden (1972), [1972] 2 All E.R. 1162 at
1166 (Fam.).
9,Ibid. at 662-63.
up by the court. Moreover, if the other side had acted on a compromise it was 
inequitable for such compromise to be avoided, and the client would be bound 
despite his attempt at withdrawal.96 The reasoning of Bray J. would support 
the validity of the decision in Neale, while allowing other courts to distinguish 
it in appropriate cases. The argument of Lord Coleridge J., on the other hand, 
would seem to invite the conclusion that the decision in Neale was both incor­
rect on the facts and wrong in principle. McCardie J., in Welsh v. Roe, while 
holding that a compromise was binding even if the solicitor agreeing to it had 
been prohibited from settling the case as long as the other side was in ig­
norance of that prohibition, also stated that a collusive compromise was void. 
One entered into negligently, however, might allow the client an action for 
breach of duty against the solicitor and in special cases the court might refuse 
to permit enforcement of a compromise.97 This last comment was substan­
tiated by a reference to the Neale case.
What then are these special circumstances? The answer is not clear, 
however, in the subsequent case of Shepherd v. Robinson Bankes L.J. pur­
ported to divide “ compromise” cases into two groups.98 He referred 
specifically to “ two distinct lines of authority relating to compromises said to 
have been made by counsel against the wishes or instructions of their clients” . 
In the first line of cases the question was whether the act of counsel had been 
within the scope of his authority. In this respect the learned Lord Justice spoke 
of the “ apparent” , not implied authority of counsel to compromise in all mat­
ters connected with the action and not merely collateral to it. Here lack of 
notice by the other party of any limitation on counsel’s apparent authority 
would mean that a compromise was binding on the client, once counsel had 
agreed and the agreement was embodied in some order of the court. The se­
cond line of authority, in which the Neale case figured prominently, held that 
before a consent order had been drawn up and perfected, the consent given by 
counsel or a solicitor may be withdrawn by the client if the counsel or the 
solicitor gave it under a misapprehension. In such cases the court would not 
proceed further with the drawing up and perfecting of the order, and would 
not lend its authority to compel observance of an agreement arrived at through 
a mistake. But in Neale it would seem difficult to find that counsel acted under 
a misapprehension. The client’s instructions were clear and unambiguous. The 
counsel involved was an eminent member of the bar. Moreover, the order to 
refer the case had already been drawn up by the court.
The suggestion is made, therefore, that early attempts to explain the deci­
sion in Neale to make it conform to the tenor of a series of prior cases have not 
been convincing. Further reference to the Neale case was made more recently 
in Marsden v. Marsden." During the hearing of a divorce action, counsel for 
the wife, contrary to express instructions, undertook on the wife’s behalf to 
release a Class F charge on the matrimonial home and abandon her interest in
Ibid. at 665.
97(1918), 87 L.J.K.B. 520 at 523.
’*(1919), [1919] 1 K.B. 474 at 477 (C.A.).
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it. Against express instructions counsel entered into an agreement with counsel 
for the husband providing for the maintenance of the wife and children. The 
husband’s counsel did not know of the limitation on the authority of counsel 
for the wife. The agreement was accepted by the court and the judge made an 
order in terms of the agreement. That order was perfected. On the same day as 
the order was perfected, either contemporaneously with the perfection of the 
order or at some time beforehand, the wife applied to the court to set aside the 
order. She had informed the court a day or two previously of her intention to 
make that application. Watkins J. held that the order should be set aside. 
Although normally orders that had been perfected could not be set aside, the 
court did so on this occasion since notice of the intention to apply to have the 
order set aside had been given before perfection and a refusal to set the order 
would result in grave injustice to the wife. In this respect the Neale case was 
both followed and distinguished. Watkins J. also held that where, unknown to 
the other party, the usual authority of counsel to compromise had been limited 
by express instructions and counsel had entered into a compromise for which 
he had no authority, the court could interfere, setting aside the compromise 
and the order based on it if grave injustice would be done by allowing the com­
promise to stand.
The judgement of Watkins J. is founded on a line of reasoning which sug­
gests that: (a) the authority of counsel to compromise, where not express, is 
implied, not apparent or ostensible; (b) to limit that authority the client’s in­
structions must be clear and unequivocal; (c) courts may nonetheless intervene 
in an agreed compromise otherwise binding on a client where to refrain from 
setting it aside might lead to grave injustice. But this discretion should not 
lightly be invoked. As Watkins J. said: “ Applications have failed in the past 
although an applicant has been present in court and heard, without understan­
ding them, the terms of the compromise announced” .100 He also made it clear 
that a court would not interfere after perfection of an order. The Neale case 
turned on its own special facts in that the plaintiff took out the order only for 
the purpose of applying to have it set aside (a strange sequence of events if in 
fact that is what really occurred).101 Marsden is clearly a very strong case for 
the exercise of discretion by the court. It leaves open to question, however, 
whether, and if so when, a court may intervene when counsel or a solicitor has 
acted without authority or indeed contrary to express instructions which would 
revoke any such authority. The case also raises again the dispute as to whether 
the lawyer’s authority to settle or compromise is implied or ostensible.
Ostensible authority was declared to be the basis for a lawyer’s power to 
bind his client through a compromise by Somers J., of the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand in Thompson v. Howley in 1976.102 In the course of a com­
prehensive discussion of the English decisions, the learned judge set out what 
he understood to be the law. First, a solicitor having commenced an action had 
ostensible authority to settle, which entitled a third party to accept a suggested 
settlement, unless any limitation in that authority was brought to the notice of
100Ibid. at 1165.
IOIZWrf. at 1166.
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the third party before settlement. Second, consent given by mistake by counsel 
could be withdrawn before any order was made by a court, where the 
assistance of the court is sought as part of the agreement to enforce a com­
promise. Third, a client would be bound by a compromise effected by his 
solicitor (despite express instructions to the contrary) unless such limitation on 
the solicitor’s authority was expressed to the other party before a settlement 
was reached. Fourth, apparent authority to settle was not necessarily co­
extensive with a solicitor’s actual authority. Fifth, a solicitor was liable to his 
client if he compromised an action contrary to instructions and it would be no 
defence for him to say that the settlement was beneficial to the client or entered 
into on the advice of counsel. Sixth, express authority to settle on particular 
terms necessarily implies a prohibition to settle on other terms. Seventh, a 
solicitor retained to commence an action has no authority as between his client 
and himself by virtue of such action to settle.
The learned judge pointed out that a solicitor would be liable for com­
promising contrary to instructions, or compromising on terms different from 
those authorized by the client.103 However, it was not clear whether he would 
be liable to his client if he compromised without authority but not against an 
express prohibition.104 If authority to settle existed, it must be granted express­
ly or properly implied by law as a necessary concomitant of the retainer in par­
ticular instances.105 Neither principle nor authority led to the proposition that 
the retainer of a solicitor carried with it an actual authority to settle an action 
the solicitor has been retained to commence except where there are express in­
structions to settle.106 A solicitor required the authority of his client to settle. 
In some situations actual authority is expressly conferred. On other occasions, 
such authority must be implied. The suggestion in Thompson is that such an 
implication is an extension of actual, express authority as a matter of law. 
However, the judgement also refers to ostensible authority, which is a matter 
of implication from fact — some conduct on the part of the client. Does the 
consent of the client to a compromise, where not expressly given, stem from a 
necessary implication of law in the absence of a clear indication to the con­
trary; or does it emerge from the fact that the client has engaged a solicitor or 
counsel to take charge of a case, again without any limitation of authority (a 
fortiori where no notice of any such limitation has been passed on to the other 
side in the litigation)? The answer is not clear.
Against the line of decisions noted earlier which indicate that a lawyer’s 
authority to settle is implied into his employment in a case, there is not only the 
judgement of the House of Lords in Neale and the ambiguous language of the 
New Zealand decision, but also the judgement of Brightman L. J. in the recent 
English case of Waugh v. H.B. Clifford & Sons L td . 107 The learned Lord 
Justice began by distinguishing between:
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the implied authority o f a solicitor to compromise an action without prior reference 
to  his client for consent, and... the ostensible or apparent authority o f a solicitor to 
compromise an action on behalf o f his client without the opposing litigant being re­
quired for his own protection either (i) to scrutinise the authority o f the solicitor of 
the other party, or (ii) to demand that the other party (if an individual) himself signs 
the terms o f compromise or (if a corporation) affixes its seal or signs by a director or 
other agent possessing the requisite power under the articles o f association or other 
constitution of the corporation.10'
After considering many of the leading cases Brightman L. J. stated that it 
was well-established that the solicitor or counsel retained in an action had im­
plied authority as between himself and his client to compromise without 
reference to the client, provided that the compromise did not involve matter 
“ collateral to the action” ; and ostensible authority, as between himself and 
the opposing litigant to compromise the action without actual proof of 
authority, subject to the same limitation.109 The implied authority of a lawyer 
was not as extensive as his ostensible authority (although this had never been 
decided before by any case).110 His lordship illustrated the difference by citing 
the example of a solicitor purporting to settle a defamation action. He would 
have ostensible authority to compromise even if he were offering a very large 
sum on the part of his client; it would be officious for the other party’s 
solicitor to demand to be satisfied as to the other’s authority to make the offer. 
But it did not follow that the offering solicitor would have his client’s implied 
authority to agree to damages on so large a scale without the agreement of his 
client.
In the light o f the solicitor’s knowledge of his client’s cash position it might be quite 
unreasonable and indeed grossly negligent for the solicitor to commit his client to 
such a burden without first inquiring if  it were acceptable ."1
Thus an opposing litigant need only ask himself whether the suggested com­
promise contains matter “ collateral to the suit” . The magnitude of the com­
promise or the burden which its terms impose on the other party are irrelevant. 
However, the solicitor who is offering a compromise may have to ask many 
more questions when deciding whether he can safely compromise without 
reference to his client.112
The above analysis was applied to the case before the court where ostensi­
ble, not implied authority was involved. In this respect Brightman L.J. 
thought that courts should not place too restrictive a limitation on the ostensi­
ble authority of lawyers to bind their clients to a compromise. A matter should 
not be thought “ collateral” to an action unless it really involved extraneous
'01 Ibid. at 1102, italics in the original.
109Ibid. at 1105: notice of the restriction of a solicitor’s authority to bind his client to a compromise would affect 
the situation; but a statement that the client was prepared in principle to compromise on certain specific terms 
was not an intimation that the client had withdrawn the ostensible authority to the solicitor to compromise on 




subject matter.113 Hence it was within the ostensible authority of the defen­
dants’ solicitors in this case to agree to terms of compromise which involved 
the handing back of defective houses in return for a price reflecting their cur­
rent value in proper condition. There was no difference, except in the relative 
importance of the subject matter, between this case and the case of the sale of 
an imperfect chattel.114
The solution in the case before the court was undoubtedly sensible. It is 
more debatable, however, whether it was necessary to differentiate the two 
kinds of authority with which a lawyer is endowed in order to achieve the 
result. The theme of this essay has been that lawyers qua lawyers may be en­
dowed with implied authority to do various things that are incidental to the 
proper performance of their duties as representatives of their clients. Insofar 
as such implications are made by the law, there is no need to postulate an ap­
parent authority to do such things. The latter, in any event, is dependent on 
what a reasonable man would believe the particular agent in question has been 
empowered to do. Employment as a lawyer might raise certain reasonable ex­
pectations in parties with whom such lawyers deal, such as the lawyer for the 
opposing side in litigation. This can only be the case however, because the law 
in the past has supported and encouraged, even created, the belief that lawyers 
are entitled to do certain things, including compromise an action once they 
have been appointed to represent someone and especially when they have been 
appointed to have the conduct of an action. The foregoing discussion has been 
directed towards clarifying what the law has determined lawyers can and can 
not do in respect of those matters which have been entrusted to them by their 
clients. A distinction has been made between situations not involving litigation 
and those in which the lawyer has been engaged to conduct a suit against 
another party, whether on behalf of the plaintiff or the defendant. The logical 
consequence of this, it is suggested, is that the wider power of a lawyer, ex­
ceeding his express authority, is derived from implication of law, not from any 
holding out by the client.
If a lawyer has implied authority to compromise, as Brightman L. J. sug­
gests, it seems difficult to deduce as a result that the lawyer who goes too far, 
though without fraud, negligence, or other misconduct, has been guilty of a 
breach of duty. On the other hand, if the lawyer’s authority is founded on a 
representation by his client, a holding out which gives rise to ostensible or ap­
parent authority, then the liability of a lawyer who has no power to com­
promise, or the power to compromise only on certain terms, will follow even if 
the lawyer has not been fraudulent or negligent. The mere breach of his in­
structions or the assumption of authority when it is lacking suffices to create 
liability. All this is plainly indicated in the earlier cases. When Brightman L.J. 
spoke of a lawyer’s lack of implied authority to agree to damages on a very 
large scale, what he was doing in fact, it is respectfully suggested, was putting a 
limit on a lawyer’s implied authority. Any lawyer should now know that a 
lawyer dealing with him, and purporting to compromise, may not have 
authority to do so where large sums of money are involved and should obtain
113Ibid. at 1106.
114Ibid.: cf. ibid. at 1107.
proof that the lawyer with whom he is dealing has been given express authority 
to compromise on such terms. Prior to Waugh v. H.B. Clifford & Sons, it 
might have been argued that the lawyer’s implied authority to compromise ex­
tended to whatever scale of damages were involved; this is no longer possible. 
May it be concluded, however, that a lawyer who purports to settle on terms 
which involve large sums of money has been held out as having authority to do 
so, as Brightman L.J. suggests? Only if in the particular circumstances, some 
conduct by the lawyer’s client could reasonably lead the opposing solicitor or 
counsel to hold such a belief. This may well be the case, just as it might be the 
case that if large sums of money are involved in the litigation the lawyer’s im­
plied authority may extend to settlement on terms involving a great sum of 
money.
The attempted rationalization formulated by Brightman L.J., involving a 
dichotomy between implied and ostensible or apparent authority, is not well- 
founded. It oversimplifies, and paradoxically, confuses the situation. 
Moreover, it ignores some fundamental notions of the law of agency. Implied 
authority is real or actual authority and depends upon what may be implied as 
between principal and agent by reason of necessity, custom, previous dealings 
or statute. Ostensible authority is dependent on whether the agent was “ held 
out” by the principal as having authority. It is a question of fact in every case. 
Brightman L.J. seems to suggest that in every instance a solicitor or counsel 
will always have such ostensible authority to compromise as between himself 
and the opposing litigant, unless there is notice to the contrary. In this respect 
the learned judge appears to have forgotten the essential distinction between 
implied and ostensible authority and the formulation of these two types of 
authority by Diplock L.J. in Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties 
(Mangal) L td .lli
VII
Canadian courts have been more concerned with the compromises or set­
tlements than with any other aspect of the authority of lawyers. In their ap­
proach to the issues and problems they have been guided by developments in 
the English courts. Their attitudes and language may be said to reflect the 
uncertainty and confusion already noted. Like their English counterparts, 
Canadian judges have been concerned about balancing the need to uphold 
compromises entered into in circumstances in which the other side might be en­
titled to rely upon the lawyer’s authority with the desire to avoid injustice by 
holding a client bound by an unfair settlement or compromise. Consequently 
they have held that a compromise is unenforceable if incomplete or vague, if 
entered into under mistake or duress, or was the result of misapprehension on 
the part of the client or his lawyer.116 They have stated that a change of mind 
will not entitle a client to repudiate a negotiated settlement unless it is defeasi-
ll5(1963-64), [1964] 1 All E.R. 630 at 644 (C.A.).
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ble on one of the grounds just mentioned.117 They have echoed the distinction 
between settlements not yet embodied in an order of a court and those which 
have been “ perfected” .118 Underlying every case in which this problem has 
been considered, however, is the central issue of the authority of a lawyer to 
make settlements or compromises. It is accepted in Canada, as it would appear 
to be in England, that the authority of a lawyer to settle or compromise must 
be qualified by factors such as mistake, misapprehension and, of course, pro­
hibition by the client when communicated to the other side. Agreement on 
these factors, however, does not resolve the problem of determining the 
juridical nature of the lawyer’s authority.
Earlier cases speak of an agent’s “ general authority” to compromise an 
action and bind his client.119 In 1966 however, in Scherer v. Palet ta, Evans 
J.A ., speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal, referred to the “ apparent 
authority” of a lawyer to bind his client to a particular compromise, though he 
also mentioned the discretionary powers of the court.120 That apparent 
authority arose from the retainer which a lawyer received to act for his client 
and the usual activities of a lawyer. Two years later the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal reverted to the expression “ general authority” in Propp v. 
Fleming, which applied Scherer v. Paletta. 121 That general authority to com­
promise an action could not be attacked subsequently unless the solicitor 
misapprehended his instructions. In that instance there was no such misap­
prehension. The court accordingly ordered a stay of the action except for the 
carrying out of the terms of the settlement. Consistently with this approach, an 
Alberta judge in a subsequent case held that a solicitor acting under a general 
retainer had the power to discontinue an action (no question of a settlement 
being involved).122
A Manitoba court was faced with the issue in Philipp v. Southam in 
1981.123 Here the plaintiff specifically instructed his solicitor not to settle. A 
subsequent agreement between the plaintiff’s solicitor and the defendant was 
not enforceable as it was made without the plaintiff’s authority. Therefore the 
plaintiff’s action could not be dismissed.124 The court noted that a solicitor ac­
ting under a general retainer, in the absence of any restriction, had charge of 
the conduct of the action and all things incidental thereto. This included the 
power to compromise, to negotiate a settlement and to do all things necessary 
in the action provided he did so with the honest belief that he was acting in the
111 Re Solicitor (1942), [1942] O.R. 604 (C.A.); Re Rose (1943), [1943] O.W.N. 457 (C.A.).
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best interests of his client.125 Such a solicitor might be liable if he exceeds his 
instructions. But the opposing solicitor was entitled to rely on the fact that the 
other was the solicitor of record, and was under no obligation to enquire into 
the latter’s authority to negotiate. Such statements do not clarify whether the 
solicitor’s authority is implied or apparent. In neither case would the opposing 
solicitor be under any duty to enquire into the legitimacy of the other 
solicitor’s negotiation of a settlement, at least in the absence of some 
suspicious circumstances. However it might be reasoned from the remarks as 
to the liability of a solicitor exceeding instructions that ostensible or apparent, 
rather than implied authority is meant. Since, as previously explained, implied 
authority is part of an agent’s actual authority, an agent acting within such 
authority, by definition, cannot be said to exceed his authority. This would not 
be the case where an agent acts with apparent authority. What he does in such 
circumstances may bind his principal to a third party; but it leaves the agent 
open to an action by the principal for acting without authority, hence the 
criticism which has already been made of the remarks of Brightman L.J. in the 
English case of Waugh v. H.B. Clifford & Sons Ltd.
Apparent authority was the basis for the decision in Landry v. Landry 
which concerned an agreement between counsel for a husband and counsel for 
a wife in a divorce action.126 The agreement bound the husband. It was not 
necessary, said Hart J.A., to show that counsel had full authority to make 
such an agreement.127 Although it is not clear, it seems that the learned judge 
meant that it was unnecessary to demonstrate that counsel had express or ac­
tual authority. In other words, as was pointed out in the New Zealand case of 
Thompson v. Howley, the ostensible or apparent authority of a lawyer is not 
co-extensive with his actual authority; it may go beyond what was agreed bet­
ween client and lawyer as to the powers of the latter in the conduct of litiga­
tion.12* A much fuller discussion is found in the judgement of Hallett J. in 
Pineo v. Pineo, which purported to follow Scherer v. Paletta.129 The plaintiff 
sued for damages for the failure of her ex-husband to comply with the terms of 
an agreement relating to the division of property upon separation prior to 
divorce. Hallett J. held that the husband’s solicitor had apparent authority to 
negotiate a settlement; consequently the husband was bound. The learned 
judge purported to follow earlier Canadian and English authority in holding 
that: (i) there could be no enforcement of a compromise arrived at through 
mistake; (ii) once a court has given effect to a compromise it must stand; (iii) a 
compromise made by counsel against the wishes or instructions of his client 
will bind the client as long as it was within the scope of counsel’s authority and 
related to matters that were connected with the action and not collateral to it. 
The settlement of property between these separated spouses was not collateral 
to the pending divorce. Since a divorce petition had been issued, the solicitor 
for the husband had apparent authority to deal with the question of property.
1 “ Citing Rogan v. Prud’homme (1924), [1925] 1 W.W.R. 479 (Man. K.B.).
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Since the settlement had been approved by the court, the husband could not 
withdraw in the absence of evidence of any potential grave injustice. The se­
cond line of authorities referred to by Bankes L.J. in Shepherd v. Robinson 
did not apply.130
Shepherd v. Robinson was a case in which the compromise was not effec­
tive. The case was returned to the list for hearing because the defendant had in­
structed his solicitor not to settle. As the compromise was consented to under a 
misapprehension, and not effectuated by the court, it was not enforceable 
aginst the wishes of the defendant. In the absence of such explicit instructions 
against settlement, the husband in Pineo v. Pineo was bound by what his 
solicitor had done. There was no question or suggestion of any misapprehen­
sion on the part of the solicitor. In other words, once a solicitor has been re­
tained to act in some litigation and has been given authority to compromise the 
action or negotiate a settlement, that authority cannot be attacked unless the 
solicitor misapprehended his instructions. This proposition was expressed by 
Estey J. in the Saskatchewan case of Revelstoke Companies v. Moose Jaw, in 
which the learned judge followed Propp v. Fleming and Scherer v. Paletta.'31 
A settlement or compromise will be binding on the ground that it was made by 
a solicitor acting with authority unless: (a) his authority was limited and the 
other side had notice of this prior to the signing of the minutes of settlement; 
or (b) the minutes of settlement were incomplete or vague; or (c) some question 
of the validity or enforceability of the settlement existed by reason of fraud or 
lack of capacity. If the settlement had been entered into by mistake on the part 
of the solicitor, Estey J. indicated that the principal’s remedy would be against 
his solicitor rather than against the other party to the settlement.132 According­
ly the defendant could not upset a settlement negotiated by his solicitor. The 
plaintiff was entitled to judgement in accordance with the agreement reached 
between the parties’ solicitors. But the “ authority” to which Estey J. referred 
is not clear. His language seems to indicate some express authority to settle. 
The facts of the case and the decisions on which the learned judge relied in­
volve authority that is not express, but either implied or, as in Pineo v. Pineo, 
apparent.
Reliance was placed on the judgement of Bankes L.J. in Shepherd v. 
Robinson most recently by Nathanson J. of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 
in Begg v. East Hants (Municipality) and Nova Scotia (Director o f  Assess­
ment).131 In this instance, however, unlike Pineo v. Pineo and, presumably, 
the Revelstoke Companies case, the circumstances fell within the second line 
of cases set out by Bankes L.J. — those where the compromise was entered in­
to under a mistake or a misapprehension. The plaintiff bought land at a tax 
sale and received a tax deed from the municipality. The Crown asserted owner­
ship of the land, which meant that the land had been assessed incorrectly. 
After a title search had been carried out by the provincial Department of
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Lands and Forests it was learned that the Crown had only an undivided half­
interest in the land. The plaintiff then sued the municipality joining the Direc­
tor of Assessment as a defendant. An appraisal of the land set its value at 
$13,298. The director offered to settle the action by buying the plaintiff’s one- 
half interest for $6,649. The offer was refused. The director then offered to 
have the land surveyed and sub-divided at the Crown’s expense, so that the 
plaintiff could choose which half he wanted and the Crown would then convey 
him its interest in that portion, in return for which the plaintiff could convey 
his interest in the remaining half and discontinue his action against the direc­
tor. The director claimed that a settlement based on this offer was negotiated 
between his solicitor and the plaintiff’s which was accepted by the latter on 
behalf of the plaintiff. The director applied for an order to give effect to the 
settlement. The plaintiff claimed that he had authorized his solicitor to 
negotiate a settlement with the Department of Lands and Forests (which was 
not a party to the action), not with the director, against whom he intended to 
maintain a claim for damages. The learned judge held that no settlement as 
alleged by the director had ever been reached. Consequently, it was un­
necessary for the judge to consider whether, had such a settlement been reach­
ed, it would have bound the plaintiff. Nonetheless he did consider the issue, 
although everything said by him in this regard must be treated as obiter dicta.
After quoting the language of Bankes L.J. in Shepherd v. Robinson on 
the “ two distinct lines of authority” relating to compromises, Nathanson J. 
held that the case before him came within the second line of cases. Any settle­
ment that might have been negotiated between counsel would necessitate the 
court issuing a consent order. When the plaintiff discovered that his solicitor 
had agreed to a settlement, he informed the solicitor for the director of the er­
ror and withdrew his consent. In such circumstances, the court should not 
compel observance of an agreement arrived at by mistake. This was a case, 
therefore, in which the solicitor had authority to settle with X, but instead set­
tled with Y. He exceeded or disobeyed his instructions, presumably not 
through malice, fraud or any intent to act improperly, but under a mistake or 
misapprehension as to the contents of his authority. This situation falls quite 
clearly within the decisions which limit the instances in which a lawyer may be 
able to bind his client when he lacks actual, express authority to settle or com­
promise. But it throws no light on the vexed question of the nature of the 
lawyer’s authority when he has not been instructed to settle. The suggestion is 
made that, in view of the limitations placed by the law on the extent to which a 
lawyer may bind his client by a settlement he has negotiated and concluded, 
such as mistake, misapprehension, vagueness, fraud, incapacity and notice of 
want of authority given to the other side, the proper inference to draw is that 
the lawyer’s authority to settle is derived not from any holding out by the 
client, which would involve apparent or ostensible authority, but from the im­
plication by the law of some addition to the lawyer’s express authority stemm­
ing from his employment as lawyer to handle litigation, a matter of implied 
authority.
VIII
The time has come to put together these various situations, cases and ideas in 
the hope of formulating some principle or set of principles governing the con­
duct of lawyers as agents. Were it not for the “ compromise” cases, this task 
might be comparatively easy. In the absence of clear instructions to the con­
trary, a lawyer might be considered as having a certain implied authority, con­
sisting of the power to perform a number of different acts on behalf of his 
client without the need for any specific consent in advance from that client, in 
addition to whatever express authority had been entrusted to him. Everything 
within that implied authority would constitute the lawyer’s “ general 
authority” to act for his client. That general authority would be wider where 
litigation was involved than in other circumstances. Litigation involves dif­
ferent tasks and therefore gives rise to a wider general authority than does the 
performance of non-litigious activities. The juridical nature of the lawyer’s 
authority, however, would be the same whatever the task; only its content 
might differ. The “ compromise” cases, with their talk of ostensible or ap­
parent authority and their emphasis on the extension of a lawyer’s authority 
through a holding out by the client, especially to an opposing litigant or his 
lawyer, present a barrier to the simple and orderly exposition of a lawyer’s 
legal situation. They introduce a new factor or feature. This is the nebulous 
concept of “ holding out” which is dependent on the precise interpretation of 
the facts of each individual case, not on general principles of law. When courts 
allow what a lawyer has done to bind his client instead of concentrating on 
what the law should legitimately include within the scope of a lawyer’s authori­
ty to act for his client, they have invoked the idea of estoppel without using the 
language and ideology of estoppel in the course of their explanations.
The contention is that on grounds of principle as well as for pragmatic 
reasons, it would have been better and may still be possible for the courts to 
expound the position of lawyers in terms of implied authority rather than to 
rationalize the wide and vital powers of a lawyer on the more unsatisfactory, 
problematic, and less factually and legally certain ground of ostensible or ap­
parent authority. This approach is consonant with the internal logic of the 
principles of agency and more practical in terms of its utility. Whether or not it 
is too late to do this in England is a matter of debate. In Canada it is still possi­
ble.
